2007年6月27日星期三

传媒大亨默多克的中国狂热

传媒大亨默多克的中国狂热

许多大企业在过去20年来,均曾试图寻找进入中国市场的契机,但极少数能像默多克(Rupert Murdoch)的新闻集团(News Corporation)这样对中国市场热切又坚定的。(chinesenewsnet.com)

《纽约时报》6月26日大篇幅报导了默多克多年来在中国市场投入的心力。(chinesenewsnet.com)

报导指出,默多克与中国官员的接触频繁,他旗下的福克斯新闻网(Fox News)还曾协助国家广播网建立新闻网页,默多克也曾给予中国共青团电视资讯方面的指导。(chinesenewsnet.com)

默多克的第三任妻子邓文迪,曾在默多克其下的香港卫星广播网Star TV工作。邓文迪目前的角色便是管理投资与处理中国方面的事务,不过,在76岁的默多克退休或逝世后,此家族企业新闻集团该如何继续,却是一个待解决的问题。(chinesenewsnet.com)

虽然年事已高,但默多克对中国的热情并未随着时间减损。实际上,中国法律上的限制以及管理疏失曾让默多克在进军中国时遭遇挫折,2005年新闻集团竞标主要时段播放权失利后,默多克曾认为自己在中国的事业遇到了“砖墙”,因为那一场“战役”中,默多克投入了数千万美元的经费。(chinesenewsnet.com)

不过,当默多克企图买下《华尔街日报》母公司道琼斯之际,默多克在中国的营业成绩相对来说较少被注意,因为他的管理风格比起营收或亏损,更吸引人。(chinesenewsnet.com)

几位在中国为默多克工作的人士表示,默多克与中国审查·单位以及国家广播部门合作密切,他培养自己在政治方面的联系,好让他的事业能尽量不受法律的干扰。(chinesenewsnet.com)

举例来说,在某些演说或受访的场合,默多克经常公开支持中国领导的政策、攻击反对者的言论。在一封由中国记者团体对道琼斯股东发出的信中,这群人控告默多克“牺牲新闻整体性,来满足个人或政治目标。”(chinesenewsnet.com)

不过,默多克的立场让他成为受中国领导欢迎的外国媒体大亨。默多克不但曾与江泽民在北京会面,也在北京、纽约与伦敦等地不断与其他中国高层有所接触。与默多克合作的电视频道比起任何其他的外国媒体集团,还要快打入中国实际上,中国对新闻集团来说,并不是一个非有不可的市场,因为该集团在中国的营收只占整个公司的一小部分,约为680亿美元,但默多克花了15年的时间来推动成立卫星电视网,好涵盖世界每个主要市场,这市场包括中国。


新闻集团主席默多克和夫人邓文迪
(chinesenewsnet.com)

新闻集团在电视与电影方面的对手如华特迪士尼公司(The Walt Disney Company)、维雅康姆(Viacom)、时代华纳(Time Warner)等,也试图将经费投入中国市场,希望取得一张当地的通行证。(chinesenewsnet.com)

不过,据默多克同僚表示,新闻集团跟对手不同的地方在于,该集团投入的更多。(chinesenewsnet.com)

在新闻集团中负责政府关系的H. S. Liu指出:“中国发现新闻集团是个真正的国王,掌控每一件事……他的对手有的则是巨大的官僚组织。”(chinesenewsnet.com)

对默多克来说,中国的意义大於企业上的收益。1997年,默多克拜访上海时,遇见了当时在香港新闻集团工作的邓文迪,邓文迪前往上海的目的,是担任默多克的翻译。(chinesenewsnet.com)

在家中是长女的邓文迪,于山东出生,邓文迪呱呱落地时,默多克正在收购伦敦的《世界新闻》。邓文迪一家人后来搬到了徐州,从此邓文迪在当地长大。(chinesenewsnet.com)

1996年,邓文迪在默多克的Star TV里实习,隔年,她遇到了默多克。(chinesenewsnet.com)

默多克在中国的热切经营,还可从几件事情中看出端倪。2001年,新闻集团封杀了末代港督彭定康所写的一篇文章,理由是该文描述一位中Gong外交人员和脱衣舞俱乐部之间的关系,被断定将影响默多克在中国的前途,因此,默多克也拒绝出版彭定康的《Eastand West》一书,因为书内对中Gong多所批评。(chinesenewsnet.com)

另一方面,默多克旗下的HarperCollins出版公司,则愿意出版邓小平女儿邓榕所着的《邓小平——女儿心中的父亲》一书,此书描写了邓小平的生平,而默多克则可得到100万美元的报酬,只是,此书的销量并不好。(chinesenewsnet.com)

此外,Star TV也配合中国的口味来调整节目内容。1994年,Star TV撤下了英国广播公司BBC的新闻,理由是BBC的新闻不断播放一名在天anmen广场前、躺在tanke车下的青年画面,让中国政府感到气愤。(chinesenewsnet.com)

默多克表示,此决定是出于商业考量,不是政治因素。


新闻集团积极与道琼斯商议收购事宜。(路透社)
(chinesenewsnet.com)

《纽约时报》称,中国馆方向来不喜欢西方新兴媒体对中国的报导,而希望能以自己想要的形象在世界面前露脸,默多克正好提供了这样的管道。(chinesenewsnet.com)

1996年,默多克与曾是中央人民广播电台记者的刘长乐联手开办了兼具新闻与娱乐频道的凤凰卫视,凤凰卫视的前身是香港卫视中文台,由默多克从李泽楷手中收购过来。(chinesenewsnet.com)

在合作计画下,刘长乐掌控的今日亚洲和默多克旗下的Star TV在新组建的凤凰卫视中各持股45%,余下的10%由华颖国际广告公司所有;显然看好中国传媒市场的默多克希望借与刘长乐共同成立的凤凰卫视做管道,打入中国内地市场。(chinesenewsnet.com)

但实际情况是,由于中国的政策限制和盗版等因素,默多克在进入中国市场方面一直鲜有突破性的进展。(chinesenewsnet.com)

直至2006年6月,本与今日亚洲并列为第一大股东的Star TV,做出减持股份的决定,之后Star TV将以17.6%的持股退居第三席,今日亚洲则以37.5%的持股成为凤凰卫视的单一最大股东。Star TV将凤凰卫视19.9%的股权出售给中移动。(chinesenewsnet.com)

默多克在声明中表示,希望藉此与中移动结缘,双方将建立广泛的战略合作伙伴关系,共同开拓无线传媒业务。(chinesenewsnet.com)

此外,新闻集团也将触角伸到中央电视台。当默多克得知央视希望发展新闻网时,默多克派出了福克斯新闻小组协助央视设计与经营新闻网。(chinesenewsnet.com)

此外,新闻集团也与美国“国家地理频道”筹建电视节目制作合资公司,国家地理频道由新闻集团与国家地理电视和美国全国广播公司共同拥有,该计画每年提供300小时的电视节目,为中央电视台下属的两家数字付费电视开发商“中数传媒”和节目供应商“央视风云传播”提供支持。(chinesenewsnet.com)

默多克前中国地区经理指出,新闻集团的想法是,以他们的技术来交换中国方面同等的回馈。(chinesenewsnet.com)

1998年12月,江泽民会见了默多克,肯定了新闻集团在促进“让世界了解中国和让中国了解世界”方面所做的努力。


默多克与星空卫视。
(chinesenewsnet.com)

1999年3月,新闻集团北京代表处成立,2000年,Star TV在上海设立代表处,成为首家获准在沪设立代表处的境外传媒公司。2000年5月,默多克任命他的二儿子杰智(James Murdoch)为Star TV的总裁,他本人每年至少前往中国考察两次,显示出默多克对中国市场的重视。(chinesenewsnet.com)

2000年至2003年间担任总裁的杰智,曾于2001年在洛杉矶的演说中表示,在中国的西方记者支持所谓的扰乱力量,对中国政府来说,是“非常、非常危险的”。(chinesenewsnet.com)

2002年,Star TV通过广东有线电视网正式开播。虽然据新闻集团2005年的年报显示,Star TV视吸引了超过820万的用户,创该台历史最高,但由于广东当地电视台在节目上插播自己的广告等因素,Star TV的盈利状况始终不佳,且新闻集团的掌控范围只有9个频道,除了被获准在广东省全面落地,其他绝大部分频道都被局限于在三星级以上宾馆与涉外小区内播放,默多克想要更多。(chinesenewsnet.com)

好消息在2004年底降临。该年新闻集团以间接方式,将自制内容通过青海卫视向全国观众播放,此外,新闻集团也购买了中国25个省分的主要时段播放权。2005年8月,这项试图通过青海卫视扩大在中国收视范围的举措却被国家广电总局叫停,一度引发“新闻集团准备撤离中国”的话题。(chinesenewsnet.com)

但这位传媒大亨并未放弃,2006年11月,默多克分别拜会了北京奥组委主席刘淇与中 宣部部长刘云山,表明为2008年北京奥运会宣传作贡献的愿望。(chinesenewsnet.com)

此外,默多克还投身手机事业。同年11月,默多克出现在Star TV与中国移动在京举办的新闻发布会现场,与中移动董事长王建宙一同现身。这次两人是为了宣布共同推出“[V]无线原创音乐平台”而来。(chinesenewsnet.com)

此平台建立于中国移动的移动梦网上,提供2.87亿的中国移动用户直接通过手机下载歌曲,并投票选出自己最喜爱的作品,而优秀的作品将被拍摄成专业MV,并在Channel[V]、Star TV及全国多家电视频道播出。(chinesenewsnet.com)

另一项计画,便是针对中国的MySpace事业。邓文迪去年底与新闻集团高管一道工作,就MySpace进入中国的合资计划展开行动;今年春季,此计画已开始执行。且MySpace的每个网页上,均有报告“不当资讯”的连结,当使用者能随时通知官方。微软、Google、雅虎在中国的网页也有类似的机制。(chinesenewsnet.com)

此外,默多克将很快地能将北京当成另一个家。默多克于北京花费500万美元,为家人买下了距紫禁城不远的一处四合院,目前新装潢已接近完工。(chinesenewsnet.com)
Murdoch’s Dealings in China: It’s Business, and It’s Personal


By JOSEPH KAHN
Published: June 26, 2007

BEIJING, June 25 — Many big companies have sought to break into the Chinese market over the past two decades, but few of them have been as ardent and unrelenting as Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation.
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Chris Pizzello/Reuters

Rupert and Wendi Murdoch at a Hollywood party in February.
The Murdochracy
Ventures in China
Murdoch, Ruler of a Vast Empire, Reaches Out for Even More (June 25, 2007)
Times Topics: Rupert Murdoch
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Doug Kanter/Bloomberg News

A receptionist at the News Corporation’s offices in Beijing. Television channels affiliated with Rupert Murdoch beam more programming into China than any other foreign media group.

Mr. Murdoch has flattered Communist Party leaders and done business with their children. His Fox News network helped China’s leading state broadcaster develop a news Web site. He joined hands with the Communist Youth League, a power base in the ruling party, in a risky television venture, his China managers and advisers say.

Mr. Murdoch’s third wife, Wendi, is a mainland Chinese who once worked for his Hong Kong-based satellite broadcaster, Star TV. Her role in managing investments and honing elite connections in China has underscored uncertainties within the Murdoch family about how the family-controlled News Corporation will be run after Mr. Murdoch, 76, retires or dies.

Regulatory barriers and management missteps have thwarted Mr. Murdoch’s hopes of big profits in China. He has said his local business hit a “brick wall” after a bid to corral prime-time broadcasting rights fell apart in 2005, costing him tens of millions of dollars.

But as he seeks to buy Dow Jones, the parent company of The Wall Street Journal, his track record in China has attracted attention less because of profits and losses than for what it shows about his management style.

Mr. Murdoch cooperates closely with China’s censors and state broadcasters, several people who worked for him in China say. He cultivates political ties that he hopes will insulate his business ventures from regulatory interference, these people say.

In speeches and interviews, Mr. Murdoch often supports the policies of Chinese leaders and attacks their critics. A group of China-based reporters for The Journal accused him in a letter to Dow Jones shareholders of “sacrificing journalistic integrity to satisfy personal and political aims,” a charge the News Corporation denies.

His courtship has made him the Chinese leadership’s favorite foreign media baron. He has dined with former President Jiang Zemin in the Zhongnanhai leadership compound in Beijing and repeatedly met other members of the ruling Politburo in Beijing, New York and London. Television channels affiliated with Mr. Murdoch beam more programming into China than any other foreign media group.

“The reality is that the Chinese government is not going to let anything radical happen in media,” says Gary Davey, an Australian who once ran Star TV for Mr. Murdoch. “But we got a lot farther than anyone else did.”

News Corporation officials in Beijing and Hong Kong declined to comment for this article. After The New York Times began a two-part series on Monday about how Mr. Murdoch operates his company, the News Corporation issued a statement:

“News Corp. has consistently cooperated with The New York Times in its coverage of the company. However, the agenda for this unprecedented series is so blatantly designed to further the Times’s commercial self interests — by undermining a direct competitor poised to become an even more formidable competitor — that it would be reckless of us to participate in their malicious assault. Ironically, The Times, by using its news pages to advance its own corporate business agenda, is doing the precise thing they accuse us of doing without any evidence.”

China has never been a make-or-break proposition for the News Corporation, since its operations here represent a small part of the company, which is valued at $68 billion. But Mr. Murdoch pushed for nearly 15 years to create a satellite television network that would cover every major market in the world, including China.

He coveted the $50 billion in ad spending that flows mainly to China’s state-owned news media whose products, even after years of improvements, still reflect propaganda directives as well as consumer demand.

The News Corporation’s competitors in television and film, the Walt Disney Company, Viacom and Time Warner, also had to accommodate Chinese demands as the price of admission to the local market.

But Mr. Murdoch gave more, his associates said.

“The Chinese discovered that Rupert was a real emperor who controlled everything himself,” said H. S. Liu, who oversaw government relations for the News Corporation in China. “His rivals had big, cautious bureaucracies that could not always deliver.”

China has long meant more than business to the Murdoch clan. Mr. Murdoch’s father, Keith, wrote about China as a war correspondent in the 1930s. As a newspaper proprietor in Australia, he collected Ming dynasty porcelain.



When Rupert Murdoch visited Shanghai in 1997, Wendi Deng, then a junior News Corporation employee in Hong Kong, flew up to serve as his translator. Together they explored Shanghai, which was then emerging as a lively center of finance and commerce.
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Pool photo by Mark Terrill

Jiang Zemin, then president of China, meeting with Mr. Murdoch in 1997.
The Murdochracy
Ventures in China
Murdoch, Ruler of a Vast Empire, Reaches Out for Even More (June 25, 2007)
Times Topics: Rupert Murdoch

“He was knocked over by the place,” recalled Bruce Dover, a former China manager for Mr. Murdoch, “and by her.” Within two years, Mr. Murdoch had left his second wife, Anna Mann, and married Ms. Deng.

Clawing Back

Mr. Murdoch’s initial foray into China was disastrous. Shortly after he purchased the satellite broadcaster Star TV in Hong Kong for nearly $1 billion in 1993, he made a speech in London that enraged the Chinese leadership.

He said that modern communications technology had “proved an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere.” Star could beam programming to every corner of China, and Murdoch had paid a big premium for the broadcaster for that reason.

Prime Minister Li Peng promptly outlawed private ownership of satellite dishes, which had once proliferated on rooftops. Star TV faced a threat to its viability.

Chinese leaders rebuffed his attempts to apologize in person — a ban that lasted nearly four years. But he sought to placate them. One target was Deng Xiaoping, then retired but still China’s senior leader.

HarperCollins, Mr. Murdoch’s book unit, published a biography of Mr. Deng written by his daughter, Deng Rong. Although it mainly recycled propaganda about Mr. Deng, Mr. Murdoch threw an elaborate book party at Le Cirque in New York. The book sold poorly.

He also cultivated ties with Mr. Deng’s eldest son, Deng Pufang, who is disabled. Mr. Murdoch chartered a jet to ferry a troop of disabled acrobats that the younger Mr. Deng had promoted to perform abroad, according to a former News Corporation official.

Star TV overhauled its programming to suit Chinese tastes. In 1994 it dropped BBC News, which had frequently angered Chinese officials with its reports on mainland affairs.

Mr. Murdoch said the decision was made for business reasons, not political reasons. Mr. Davey, who then ran Star TV, agreed that cost was a primary consideration.

But he said he had pressed the British broadcaster to stop showing a video of a man facing down a tank outside Tiananmen Square — an indelible image from China’s crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in 1989 — during its on-air programming breaks. He said the BBC refused, calling the video a “journalistic presentation.”

“The BBC never got the sensitivities of the situation,” Mr. Davey said. “It was relentless and stupid. Neither party was too upset about ending the relationship.”

If Star was a potential threat to the one-party state, it was also a new opportunity. Chinese officials disliked Western news media coverage of China and wanted to present their own face to the world. Mr. Murdoch provided the access they wanted.

In 1996, he entered a joint venture with Liu Changle, a onetime radio host for the People’s Liberation Army who had connections with propaganda officials. Their joint news and entertainment channel, called Phoenix, beamed programs to the small number of urban households permitted to see foreign broadcasts in China. Mr. Murdoch transmitted the same programming around the world on his satellites.

Phoenix imitated the fast pace and on-the-scene reporting style popular in the West and shook up the mainland’s staid news media, which still featured well-coiffed narrators reading scripts about meetings between senior leaders held that day. But Phoenix also tended to steer clear of the most sensitive political topics and could be bombastically nationalistic.

Phoenix may have demonstrated that the Chinese news media could become more sophisticated and dynamic without threatening the party’s power. It also showed that Mr. Murdoch could be an asset.

“Officials realized he had a good intentions,” Mr. Liu said.

After Phoenix proved a hit, Ding Guangen, a hard-liner who exercised sweeping control over all Chinese news media as chief of the country’s Propaganda Department, granted Mr. Murdoch his first meeting. So did Zhu Rongji, then the prime minister.

Mr. Zhu noted that Mr. Murdoch had become an American citizen to comply with television ownership rules in the United States. He joked that if he wanted to broadcast more in China, he should consider becoming Chinese, a person who attended the meeting recalled.

Friendly Relations

The News Corporation’s outreach intensified. When Mr. Murdoch learned that China Central Television, known as CCTV, was struggling to develop a news Web site, he dispatched a team from Fox News to help design and operate one. Another News Corporation team brought People’s Daily, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party, online.



China also needed help encrypting satellite transmissions so it could develop a pay-TV service, a specialty of the News Corporation’s NDS subsidiary. NDS helped Beijing create a proprietary encryption system. It never realized sizable royalties, people who worked at the News Corporation said.
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The Murdochracy
Ventures in China
Murdoch, Ruler of a Vast Empire, Reaches Out for Even More (June 25, 2007)
Times Topics: Rupert Murdoch

Similarly, the company brought delegations of Chinese officials to Britain, so they could study how Mr. Murdoch’s BSkyB unit had become a lucrative gateway for satellite television in Europe.

“Our thinking was that we would show off our technology and they would contract News Corporation to do the same for them,” said Mr. Dover, Mr. Murdoch’s former China manager. “Their thinking was, ‘We want this for ourselves.’ ”

“It ended being more of a giveaway,” Mr. Dover said.

In late 1998, President Jiang invited Mr. Murdoch to Zhongnanhai. The official Xinhua news agency, reporting on the session, made clear that the media baron had a new reputation.

“President Jiang expressed appreciation for the efforts made by world media mogul Rupert Murdoch in presenting China objectively and cooperating with the Chinese press over the last two years,” Xinhua said.

The Murdochs often echoed the Chinese government line. In a 1999 interview with Vanity Fair, Mr. Murdoch spoke disparagingly of the Dalai Lama, whom the Chinese condemn as a separatist. “I have heard cynics who say he is a very political old monk shuffling around in Gucci shoes,” he said.

James Murdoch, who ran Star TV from 2000 to 2003, said in a speech in Los Angeles in 2001 that Western reporters in China supported “destabilizing forces” that are “very, very dangerous for the Chinese government.” He lashed out at the Falun Gong spiritual sect, which had just endured brutal repression in China, calling it “dangerous and apocalyptic.”

The Journal won a Pulitzer Prize for its coverage of the suppression of the Falun Gong movement in 2001. Last month, seven China-based reporters for The Journal wrote a letter to Dow Jones’s current controlling shareholders arguing that the articles on Falun Gong “may never have seen the light of day” if The Journal had been owned by Mr. Murdoch.

News Corporation officials say such fears are baseless. While several reporters who worked in China for the company’s publications in the 1990s say Mr. Murdoch’s editors pressed them to tone down their coverage of delicate issues that could anger the Chinese leadership, reporters serving in such posts now say they have not come under similar pressures.

By the late 1990s, Mr. Murdoch was traveling several times a year to the country. He was often joined by Wendi Murdoch, who left her formal position in the company but continued to scout for investments in China and participate in strategy decisions there, several people who worked for the News Corporation said.

One of her roles: introducing her husband to Chinese entrepreneurs. Many of them had received business degrees in the United States, as she had at Yale.

The Murdochs invested about $150 million in half a dozen start-up Internet and telecom companies at the height of the Internet bubble between 1999 and 2001. Only one, Netcom, returned an appreciable investment profit, two former News Corporation executives said.

But one of the entrepreneurs the Murdochs befriended during the investment spree was Jiang Mianheng, the son of President Jiang. Ms. Murdoch and some other News Corporation employees argued internally that the younger Mr. Jiang could help Star distribute its broadcasts more widely, two former News Corporation executives said.

It is unclear what role, if any, Mr. Jiang played. But in 2002, the company became the first foreign broadcaster to receive “landing rights” to sell programs to cable systems in Guangdong Province, near Hong Kong.

The license came with a catch. The News Corporation again consented to transmit Chinese programs — this time, the English-language news, talk shows and cultural shows on CCTV’s Channel 9 — to the United States and Britain. Time Warner later agreed to similar terms. But the market appeared to be opening, with the News Corporation in the lead.

Prime Time

The News Corporation and its joint venture partners controlled 9 of the 31 foreign channels, including news, movies, music videos and sports, more than any other foreign media company. Officially, however, it could still reach only government and foreign compounds and luxury hotels, as well as homes in Guangdong. Mr. Murdoch wanted more.

Good news appeared to come in 2004. The authorities began allowing Chinese-foreign joint ventures to produce shows that could be broadcast locally without the restrictions that apply to overseas content.
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The Murdochracy
Ventures in China
Murdoch, Ruler of a Vast Empire, Reaches Out for Even More (June 25, 2007)
Times Topics: Rupert Murdoch

Mr. Murdoch interpreted the order liberally. The News Corporation allied itself with a state-run broadcaster in the western province of Qinghai. The arrangement covered not only production but also distribution. Through middlemen, the News Corporation also purchased prime-time slots in 25 Chinese provinces. It had become a backdoor national broadcaster.

Aware that the venture pushed the limits of what regulators allowed, the News Corporation sought to arrange political cover, people involved in arranging the deal said. It recruited a media and stock market entrepreneur named Ding Yuchen to join the venture as a partner. Mr. Ding’s father, Ding Guangen, was the longtime propaganda chief. A second partner was the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League, considered the political power base of China’s new top leader, Hu Jintao.

In comments to News Corporation investors in early 2005, Mr. Murdoch boasted of a “new venture,” which he did not name, “where we’ll have nearly 50 percent of a prime-time channel, which will have access to well over 100 million homes.”

It did not endure. The News Corporation used Qinghai to broadcast branded shows it had produced for its own, more limited channel. When they began appearing nationally, competitors complained that Mr. Murdoch was getting special treatment.

The Propaganda Department forced the News Corporation to end its involvement with Qinghai shortly thereafter. The cost of the debacle: between $30 million and $60 million, people connected to the company at the time said.

News Corporation executives said they felt the political winds had shifted against them. President Jiang, who retired from his final post as military chief in 2004, had lost much of his day-to-day influence. President Hu’s propaganda team pulled in the reins. Mr. Murdoch said publicly that he had hit a “brick wall.”

Mr. Liu, Mr. Murdoch’s partner at Phoenix, said the Qinghai venture “is not something I would have tried” because it ran afoul of media regulations. But he said Mr. Murdoch had not lost the good will of senior officials. “They still recognize his contributions,” he said.

When Mr. Murdoch visited China late last year, he met Liu Yunshan, Mr. Ding’s successor as propaganda chief, and Liu Qi, the party secretary of Beijing and the top coordinator for the 2008 Olympics.

The News Corporation also entered an alliance with China Mobile, the state-owned company that is the world’s largest mobile communications operator. Mr. Liu of Phoenix said the move “could open a new, lucrative highway” to provide media content to China’s 480 million mobile-phone users.

Wendi Murdoch has stepped up her role in China. She plotted a strategy for the News Corporation’s social networking site, MySpace, to enter the Chinese market, people involved with the company said. The News Corporation decided to license the MySpace name to a local consortium of investors organized by Ms. Murdoch.

As a local venture, MySpace China, which began operations in the spring, abides by domestic censorship laws and the “self discipline” regime that governs proprietors of Chinese Web sites. Every page on the site has a link allowing users or monitors to “report inappropriate information” to the authorities. Microsoft, Google and Yahoo have made similar accommodations for their Web sites in China.

The Murdochs will soon be able to call Beijing home. Workers have nearly finished renovating their traditional courtyard-style house in Beijing’s exclusive Beichizi district, a block from the Forbidden City. Beneath the steep-pitched roofs and wooden eaves of freshly coated vermillion and gold, the courtyard has an underground swimming pool and billiard room, according to people who have seen the design.

Plainclothes security officers linger on the street outside. One neighbor is the retired prime minister, Mr. Zhu, who invited Mr. Murdoch to become Chinese.

2007年6月24日星期日

笑蜀:平心静气说黑窑

笑蜀兄这篇文章说到了今日中国传媒人的痛处,特别认同“审恶疲劳”的说法。

笑蜀:平心静气说黑窑

黑窑善后似乎已到高潮。到了高潮,也就接近尾声了,似乎可以总结一下自己了。

昨天鄢烈山兄写了篇文章,说他对黑窑事件并不震惊。看了文章,我得承认他的逻辑是对的。冷静想一想,黑窑事件,原本确实不应在我的意料之外。最早可能是在七八年之前,我就听说黑窑了。一个河南人告诉我,说他家乡附近有个砖窑,工人都是拐骗来的,来了之后没有任何自由,连晚上睡觉,都要把衣服脱光交给工头看管才能睡,目的很简单,他们赤身裸体就没法逃了。他们每天劳动十多个小时,一分钱的工资没有。还说有几个想逃的被工头打死了,尸体拉出去埋在沙地里,埋的很浅后来还被发现了,但都没人管。那时我只是一个穷教员,很少与人交往,几乎没有任何社会资源。加上那个河南人自己也很恐惧,没有交代黑窑的具体所在。所以只是跟学法律的同事商量了一下,彼此除了摇头叹息,都没别的法子可想。

这方面我还听说过更惨的故事。那时收容经济还挺繁荣的,被收容的“无证人员”,一般的下场是到挖沙场当劳工,实际上就是奴工。据说年老体弱的,没有压榨价值的收容对象,就让铁路方面押走。铁路方面把他们押出省界后,往往一脚把他们从正在行驶的火车上踢下去,他们往往因此致残。

再过几年,我离开大学去了北京。北京警察找我交流思想,我不胜其烦,曾提示他们,不妨把找我的精力,用来给农民工讨公道,比如那些被踢下火车的农民工就很需要他们。但警察听了只是笑笑,说他们也没办法,敢这么干的都是有背景的,他们去了也对付不了,甚至可能自身难保。

报上的黑窑报道,不是经常,但偶尔看到。那些报道常常神龙见头不见尾,故事开了头,再就没下文了。老实说,我也没有追问的兴趣。为什么呢?慢慢我就觉得平常了。

这就是说,我已经逐渐麻木了,有了一种审恶疲劳。刚开始出校门,到北京一家杂志社,那时很冲动。因为到了北京才知道,原来中国那么多的罪恶,那么多的苦难。不断有访民找到我的杂志社。于是打抱不平,介绍了几个冤案给主流媒体,几个冤案居然也报出来了。但结果我发现,报道用处不大,地方政府开始会紧张一下,但媒体关注的时间总是有限的,只要地方政府拖的起,拖到媒体不再关注,地方政府就可以慢慢翻脸,苦主这时一点辙没有。这样一来,非但帮不上苦主,反而可能是误了苦主。媒体报道给了他们不切实际的幻想,似乎解决问题有希望,事实上他们没有希望,他们早该撒手。但媒体给了他们幻觉,他们就更来劲了,更不肯收手,因此他们投入的、即浪费的生命成本更高。

经历的这种事情多了,我就不再有当初的冲动,往往下意识地回避访民。回避不了的,就尽可能把严酷的现实告诉他们,让他们不要有任何幻想,劝他们早收手,早回家,早点恢复正常的生活。解决他们的问题需要无限的时间,但他们的生命是有限的。更可怕的,或者说最可怕的是,他们往往不只浪费他们自己的生命,他们甚至往往拖家带口,把自己该上小学、该上中学的孩子也带上,把孩子也完全耽误了。我曾经帮过的一个农妇,她的几个孩子就一直跟着她多少年风餐露宿。她的事情见报后,她好多次带着孩子到我办公室道谢。第一次见到她的几个孩子时我真的太震撼了,怎么可以这样,怎么可以把孩子也陪进去?后来她再带孩子来,我能躲就尽量躲着她了。

讲这些是什么意思呢?讲这些主要是想讲清楚一点,没有罗宾汉了。原子式的分散的个人都是卑微的,无力的,无奈的。根除那么多的罪恶和苦难,这原本不是原子式的分散的个人的责任,原本不是原子式的分散的个人能够胜任的。

北京几年,彻底粉碎了我的自大狂。我不再相信自己能帮的上谁了。非但如此,我发现好心帮人有时反而起反作用。这个判断应该是大致不差的,我的朋友何三畏就正在印证我的这个判断。他也是热心快肠地要帮广州的一个农民工,鼓励那个农民工要敢于用法律维护自己的权益。人家听他的,就把老板告上了法庭。到了法庭才知道,农民工告状成本巨高,3000多块钱的诉讼费,对白领可能不算什么,但对农民工可能就是半年的总收入。那个农民工咬咬牙交了这3000多块钱,却什么结果都没有,跟老板的关系却更激化了,更站不住脚了。

维权就是走媒体路线,就是走法律渠道,斗争,对抗,这是我们很多知识分子固有的理念。不排除群体性事件这一套可能管用。但个体遭遇的不平,这一套基本无用则是可以大致确认的。基于这种认识,我渐渐的就生长出一种审恶疲劳,能不介入的苦难和不平,尽可能不介入。

正是因为这种心态,当媒体最初报道山西黑窑事件时,我没太在意。新京报第一时间向我约稿,要我点评山西黑窑,我拒绝了,这种事早就不新鲜,我能说些什么?这就是我当时拒绝新京报的理由。但最终这件事还是激怒了我,我最终还是不能不发飙了。

最早激怒我的是新京报的跟进报道,报道说,窑主仅仅被判15天拘留。直觉告诉我那是严重的刑事犯罪,起码涉及非法拘禁,强迫劳动,故意伤害,甚至故意杀人,怎么15天拘留就算了结了?当时我就把这则报道贴到了报社内部网,建议编辑部做头版,建议记者追踪报道——其实我这是马后炮,编辑部已经做了头版安排,记者也已经在火线了——这是我后来才知道的。我当时还承诺,如果本报报道出来,我力争做社评。

很快本报头版就报道出来了。一气读完报道,一股血直往我脑门涌。奴工也就罢了,在我意料之中,我没想到居然还役使童奴。连几岁十来岁的孩子都下的了手,还有什么下不了手的?这种人不是畜生是什么?

盛怒之下,当晚就写了《山西奴工事件本质上是一场叛乱》的檄文,可以说是一挥而就,从开笔到结稿也就半个多小时。写完了关机睡觉,打算次日投给南都评论版。但在床上睡不着,想来想去,南都再生猛也不可能发我这篇文章。既然纸媒发不出来,何不如干脆第一时间上网?

因此从第二天起,几个大网站都有了我那篇檄文。我希望网上疯狂转载,我要首先把山西奴工事件的性质确认下来,那不是普通的事件,居然在文明时代还要复辟奴隶制,而且是比奴隶制更残忍的地下奴隶制,完全把人当牲口的地下奴隶制。这难道不是反文明,反人类的颠覆性事件吗?难道不是对我们的公共安全的最高级别的威胁吗?所以我把它定义为一场叛乱。我希望尽可能多的网友读到我的这篇檄文,清楚事件的严重性。

现在看来,我的目的是达到了。那篇檄文,以及我后来呼吁军管洪洞县的另一篇檄文,几个网站的直接点击量加起来大概有50到60万,还不算大量的转贴。接下来的作用当然跟我这两篇檄文就没啥关系了,而只能归功于整个公共舆论。从定性为非法用工、劳资纠纷,到现在终于不能不承认是黑恶势力作奸犯科,不能不承认是严重的刑事犯罪,并且承认需要全国普查,这向前迈进的每一步,都是靠强大的民意、靠强大的公共舆论的直接推动。事件的真相不能说已经都揭示出来,真相或许还很远。但就我们已经知道的来看,事件的性质已经是不容争辩了。山呼海啸的公共舆论尤其是网络舆论,已经摆明:谁要想在事件的性质上搞走私,玩花样,肯定无法完全得逞。非要一意孤行,很可能要把整个的信用赔进来。这个风险成本太高,所以,仅仅定性为非法用工、劳资纠纷的尝试,最终还是不能不放弃了。

这么长时间舆论一浪高过一浪,总也平息不下去,这种景观是近几年少见的。以往每当舆论达到高潮,相应的管制措施马上会跟上来,舆论高潮马上就会平息。但这次不同。这次民愤确实太大了,是个人都不会容忍。这种情况下,赤裸裸的封杀谁都不好意思,是个人都不敢赤裸裸地直接封杀。所以直到现在,最高级别的管制措施,也不过是要引导,不要炒作,如此这般,大意无非是你们可以说,但你们能不能有话好好说?

我们曾经是原子式的分散的个人,总有一种力量让我们处于分散之中,所以我们才卑微,才无力,才无奈。但是现在不一样了,现在互联网成了最强大的粘合剂,正在把我们黏合在一起,把我们的现实生活也变成每个人可以互通互联的巨大网络。我们终于可以开始形成合力,我们终于开始有力量,我们终于可以影响我们自己的生活,可以部分地改变我们自己的生活了。

但是,有了力量,还需要理性地运用力量。盲目的力量是吓人的,会把人家也吓得盲目起来。毕竟,中国还没有完全告别国家主义时代,最强大的资源,还是在国家机器掌握之中。所以,既要显示力量,保持足够的压力,使其不能不有所忌惮,有所节制,但也不可过分激越,不要刺激野性。野性真要爆发出来,还是非常恐怖的,甚至可以说是毁灭性的。那种只求一时痛快,要冲决一切,打倒一切的狂飙做法,看起来似乎很彻底,很英勇,其实要么是天真烂漫,要么是别有用心。一方面,一点点地扩张我们现实生活中的互联网,让尽可能多的人互通互联,一点点地为社会积攒力量;另一方面保持足够的理性和克制,既要争取尽可能多的让步,又不要指望自己全赢,而是要留一点空间,要给一点办法,要给一点退路,不要把人逼急了,不要撩拨野性。这方面,我们过去的代价已经够沉重的,该变得聪明一点。

不放过任何博弈的机会,但每次博弈都应该是恰到好处。就这样稳健地博弈下去,不仅能博弈出规则,而且能博弈出价值。比如要把人当人,不可以把人当牲口,把人当牲口最终要付代价,这样的常识,就会因着此次黑窑事件而最大限度地深入人心,并直接反映到以后的规则修改之中。博弈不仅可以推动规则上的进步,更可以推动价值上的进步。而价值是什么?价值就是方向,价值就是灵魂。过度物化的当下中国,最缺的就是价值,最缺的就是方向,最缺的就是灵魂。而要补救这一切,端赖博弈。

博弈在黑窑事件善后的全过程中,一直在推动进步。这么说不是庆功,不是丧事当喜事办。的确,博弈推动的这点进步是很可怜。不能把人当牲口,不能搞地下奴隶制,到了21世纪我们还竟然需要讨论这样的问题。但没办法,现实就是如此,甚至还要严峻。黑砖窑可怕,黑煤窑不可怕?黑作坊不可怕?在各个中心城市随处可见的,把拐骗到手的小孩当乞讨道具不可怕?其中还不乏故意把健康小孩弄残的。我们与这些日常生活中的罪恶和苦难其实一直朝夕相处,我们与这些日常生活中的罪恶和苦难常常擦肩而过。还有很多更可怕的罪恶和苦难,甚至是我们明明知道却现在根本无法讨论的。我们的这个世界并不是更坏,它本来就是这个样子,它一直就是这个样子,只不过我们已经习而不察。山西黑窑事件不过是以一种极端的形式刺激了我们,惊醒了我们,让我们明白了我们真正的处境。

所以我才同意鄢烈山兄的判断,我们的确没有什么好震惊的。当初的震惊,现在冷静的回顾起来,的确显得有些可笑。我们的进步就是基于这样的一个起点。这很无情,但这就是现实。我们不是从零开始,我们根本就是从负数开始,我们的最低纲领因此只能是首先怎样消灭负数。这就注定了,我们现在的所有进步,都只能是一种可怜的进步,一种悲哀的进步,一种让人心酸的进步。但我们别无选择,我们只能有这样的进步,所以即便是这样的进步,我们也需要,也必须花大力气去争取,一顶点点这样的进步也不可以放弃。

看透了这一层,就知道怎么给自己定位了。不求一定要达到一个什么目标,只求不断地推动,有一点点推动都是成就,都该高兴。用伯恩斯坦的话说,即运动就是一切,目标是无所谓的。无所谓目标,也就不容易失望,更不至于绝望了。就这样做一头老黄牛,不急不躁地坚韧地拉车,拉这辆有着几千年专制历史的老牛车。或许这辈子根本到不了终点,那没关系,那就慢慢享受过程吧,拉着,并且快乐着。

《纽约时报》记者遭中国企业主软禁

The World
My Time as a Hostage, and I’m a Business Reporter

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By DAVID BARBOZA
Published: June 24, 2007

SHANGHAI
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Jillian Tamaki

AS an American journalist based in China, I knew there was a good chance that at some point I’d be detained for pursuing a story. I just never thought I’d be held hostage by a toy factory.

That’s what happened last Monday, when for nine hours I was held, along with a translator and a photographer, by the suppliers of the popular Thomas & Friends toy rail sets.

“You’ve intruded on our property,” one factory boss shouted at me. “Tell me, what exactly is the purpose of this visit?” When I answered that I had come to meet the maker of a toy that had recently been recalled in the United States because it contained lead paint, he suggested I was really a commercial spy intent on stealing the secrets to the factory’s toy manufacturing process.

“How do I know you’re really from The New York Times?” he said. “Anyone can fake a name card.”

Thus began our interrogation, which was followed by hours of negotiations, the partial closing of the factory complex and the arrival of several police cars, a handful of helmet-wearing security officers and some government officials, all trying to free an American journalist and his colleagues from a toy factory.

Factory bosses, I would discover, can overrule the police, and Chinese government officials are not as powerful as you might suspect in a country addicted to foreign investment.

I shouldn’t have been surprised by the reception. The last time I arrived at a factory under suspicion for selling contaminated goods (toothpaste), they quickly locked the gate and ran. A month earlier, I walked into the headquarters of a company that sold tainted pet food to the United States, and the receptionist insisted the owner was not in. When my translator called the owner, we heard his cellphone ring in the adjoining room. I peeked in and saw the boss scamper out the backdoor.

For American journalists, there’s a tradition of showing up at a crime scene, or visiting a place that has made news. But in China, where press freedoms are weak, such visits can be dangerous.

Last year, a young man working for a Chinese newspaper was beaten to death after he tried to meet the owners of an illegal coal mine. Local officials later insisted he was trying to extort money.

My colleagues at The Times have been detained several times. And one of our Chinese research assistants is now serving a three-year prison term for fraud. He originally had been accused of passing state secrets to The Times, a charge this paper has denied.

But life in China is generally much easier for business reporters like me. Usually, I’m welcomed at factories. State-owned companies often treat me like a visiting dignitary. I’m seated in a kind of royal chair next to the chairman. We drink tea and the chairman makes welcoming remarks while the company’s official photographer snaps our picture.

On the walls of many of the factories I visit are portraits of the powerful: Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and others whose images signal to anyone visiting that a factory is “connected” and has the blessing of the Communist Party.

But my toy factory visit made me wonder: who really holds the balance of the power in that relationship these days?

Many experts have told me that one of the most serious problems in China is that the government lacks the power to control the nation’s Wild West entrepreneurs, deal makers and connected factory owners.

Bribery is rampant, and government corruption widespread. Just a few weeks ago, the top food and drug regulator was sentenced to death for taking huge bribes from pharmaceutical companies. But it’s not clear that strong messages like that will stop the anarchy.

“China effectively has no oversight over anything,” said Oded Shenkar, a business professor at Ohio State University and author of “The Chinese Century: The Rising Chinese Economy and Its Impact on the Global Economy, the Balance of Power and Your Job.”

“People have this idea they are Big Brother and everyone is under watch,” Mr. Shenkar said. “But this is not China. In China, local authorities often turn a blind eye to problems because maybe they’re invested in it.”

Indeed, the impotence of local officials was clear to me from my visit to the RC2 Industrial Park in the city of Dongguan, which is thought to be the largest toy manufacturing center in the world.

The private plant is the main supplier to the RC2 Corporation, an Illinois company. And the Hong Kong or Chinese entrepreneurs who run the facility seemed to hold great sway over the government.

We had no problem entering the complex or looking around until we met “Mr. Zhong,” a rough-looking factory complex supervisor. He scolded us for entering the grounds and taking photographs, and then invited us to a small villa on the campus, a stylish house filled with luxurious rooms, black leather chairs, a giant-screen TV, a huge stock of Cuban cigars, even a massage parlor.

This would be our prison. (Business correspondents are a more fortunate breed than war reporters.) Mr. Zhong offered an interview and a tour. But he later changed his mind and issued an ultimatum: hand over the pictures or we call the police.

Confident we had signed in properly with the security guards, who had allowed us onto the campus, we opted for the police. After over an hour, the police failed to show up, and we tried to leave, only to be nearly tackled by the factory’s ragtag army of security officers.

My translator then called the police.

The scene was farcical. We were locked inside the factory gate, surrounded by 16 security guards and 4 or 5 factory bosses. All trucks trying to bring supplies in or out of the complex were rerouted. Inside, large crowds of factory workers in blue uniforms were gawking. A crowd had also gathered outside the gates.

The police arrived an hour later, listened to both sides and then stood around. More police officers came. And more police officers stood around. It was clear they had no power to intervene.

So we called government officials, who suggested other government officials, who offered up more.

Finally, after hours of waiting, a higher-level government official arrived to settle the dispute.

He was a friendly man who admitted that he could not release us, that he didn’t have the power. We should negotiate, he said. For the next five hours, he shuttled between rooms in the villa trying to negotiate a settlement. There were shouting matches. There were demands that pictures be turned over.

After hours of squabbling, Mr. Zhong demanded we write a confession saying we had trespassed. He settled for a few sentences explaining why I had come and that I had not asked his permission to take any pictures.

The fight between government and factory during our detainment seemed to underscore the dysfunctional relationship the Chinese government has with industry.

In the endless back and forth, it was apparent that the government I often imagined as being all powerful and all seeing could be powerless and conflicted when it came to local businessmen and factory owners.

When we were released early Tuesday from a local police station, where we were sent to fill out a report, we noticed that while our translator was giving an account of the day to the police, the factory bosses were laughing and dining in another room, making the nexus of power in these parts and in this age ever more clear.

2007年6月22日星期五

1995年来首次 纽约时报华尔街日报纷涨价

1995年来首次
纽约时报华尔街日报纷涨价


07年06月21日
【本报6月20日综合报道】纽约时报集团计划将于7月16日调高报纸《纽约时报》的订价与运费。公司发言人马修斯20日称,《纽约时报》自下月起在全美的订价将调高25美分,至1.25美元。
 另外,该报运费也将调高3-4%,周日版《纽约时报》在大纽约地区的售价也将自3.5美元调高至4美元。《纽约时报》周日版非常厚,像一本书。
 此外,道琼斯公司(Dow Jones & Co.)也宣布调高《华尔街日报》的价格,并由目前的1美元升到1.5美元。《华尔街日报》的新价格标准也将于7月16日执行。
 纽约时报执行长罗宾森(Janet Robinson)在全美报协(Newspaper Association of America)会议中对投资人表示,调高订价将使该报今年多增加700-800万美元收入,同时每年也将可增加1400至1600万美元。马修斯表示,报纸上一次的全国性调涨是在1995年。
 blog it

2007年6月15日星期五

我们的热爱和他们的热爱

恋旧是人之天性,我刚刚到这个项目来的时候,对于所有美国同行谈论的报业危机多少有些觉得有点夸张。无论如何,报纸已经经历了广播和电视的冲击,却依然保持着自己的份额,那么未来为什么就不能继续留下这口饭吃。

第一次项目的论坛就是谈传统媒体的前景,前途的黯淡、生存的艰难是大家的主题,轮到我发言,我跟大家开玩笑:“Wait!Wait!我们中国媒体的真正发展不过刚刚开始而已,怎么叫你们说,这就要结束啦?”我们锣鼓刚敲起来,别人已经在收拾场子了。

《纽约时报》的记者最早谈视频和音频的应用时,我的反应首先是报社内部的管理,比如对于记者的评价标准:假设一个可以写出一流的文字报道的记者,和一个文字中等,但是会拍照片,会拍录像,会做音频报道的记者,在报社的评价体系内,谁更具价值?谁做得更多?谁更有理由拿到更高的薪水?尽管不像南周这样的计件工资制,以年为周期来计算,依然会有这样的问题。

我曾经专门就这个问题问我的Fellow,他说当改变在编辑部开始,大家从心理也有所抗拒的,但是经历了最初的震荡之后,他们已经开始感受到多媒体带来的好处。多媒体是一种工具,这个工具可以直接用来做报道,可以用来补充和辅助报道,也可以增进和读者沟通。比如《纽约时报》的埃里克是去伊拉克报道军事行动的,随身的录像机录下他的采访过程,这个Video(我觉得用Video这个词儿省事儿,因为录像、视频都是这一个词)对于看过了报道还不过瘾的人来说就很有意思,因为可以看到伊拉克的现实图景,听到记者的声音,立刻能拉近报道和读者的距离,同时拓宽了报道的维度和容量,文字和图像是并行不悖,互相补充的,并非要取而代之。

再说起来摄影记者。摄影记者对多媒体的反对实在是出乎意料的,因为多媒体的使用对摄影记者更为有利,摄影记者对报纸最大的抱怨是空间问题,因为版面的限制,或者因为对于文字内容的判断问题,摄影记者只能在新闻纸上展示他们非常有限的作品,比如《纽约时报》的这篇关于运动员受伤致残之后的境遇问题的报道
,可以看到,版面上只有一大一小两张图入选,但像这样的一个主题,摄影师肯定有其他不少依然具有信息含量或者一定艺术性的照片,而同时,假如能够让被采访者的声音出现,这个报道的感染力就肯定会大增,所以时报的多媒体频道就制作了一个带有声音的Audio幻灯,
在这里,运动员自己平静的讲述和展示他们生活的悲凉场景的画面一起进行,最后,一个运动员的声音失控差点哭起来了,幻灯片戛然而止——非常简短,但也非常有力。

假如多了一个报道手段的选择,为什么不去尝试一下呢?就好像在摄影中有人是胶片原教旨主义,胶片是有胶片独特的好,但不是很多人也早就用数码来进行创作了?而且,也许未来胶片依然存在,但只是在非常有限的一群人中间,就好比黑胶唱片,好比烟斗,好比写在纸上上的信,具有让人热爱的美好品质,但是却无可挽回地退出大众的生活。

报纸会死亡吗?其实按照去年的世界报业协会的数据,除了北美地区,其他地区的报纸发行量都还是在增长之中,但北美的状况是不是很快就是其他地区的未来呢?将报道多媒体化是否就能挽救报纸的命运?也未必,但这是应对危机的一种尝试。

我们对于纸上阅读的热爱固然重要,但作为从业者,研究大众尤其是年轻一代的阅读习惯的改变更为重要,而他们热爱网络,热爱各种新鲜的东西。我在美国对于报业的挣扎和从业者的恐惧有所体会,既然改变是必然的,早些准备总比晚些好。

报纸这个媒介本身的变化,未来的发展也是不可知的,比如电子纸现在在技术上已经成为可能,也许再过5年10年,就是拿在手中,报纸的形态也已经完全不同了呢?这是个变化的时代,一切对于美好的旧事物的留恋最终可能都会破碎。

2007年6月14日星期四

华尔街日报:道琼斯收购双方离共识仍有距离

道琼斯收购双方离共识仍有距离

2007年06月14日11:16英 | 大 | 中 | 小
控股道琼斯公司(Dow Jones & Co.)的班克罗夫特(Bancroft)家族正在考虑新闻集团提出的收购方案,为了在达成交易的情况下保证道琼斯旗舰产品《华尔街日报》的编辑独立性,他们正在修改一份回应方案。不过,据知情人士透露,从方案中可能包含的某些条款看,双方离达成共识仍有距离。

如果班克罗夫特家族与新闻集团在这些问题上达成一致,双方的谈判焦点将很快转向价格问题,届时道琼斯董事会也将参与谈判。新闻集团目前的出价是50亿美元。

相关报导
• 特别报导: 新闻集团收购道琼斯
班克罗夫特家族曾表示,只有先就《华尔街日报》的独立性达成协议,他们才会继续与鲁珀特•默多克(Rupert Murdoch)旗下的新闻集团继续谈判。

上述知情人士透露,班克罗夫特家族提出的方案与新闻集团1981年初收购《泰晤士报》(the Times)及《星期日泰晤士报》(Sunday Times)所实行的结构有所不同。很多人认为,那时所采用的架构在防止默多克干预报纸编辑事务方面不是很有效。

重要的是,班克罗夫特家族所提方案不仅是为了使《华尔街日报》的主管编辑不受新闻集团的干涉,他们所保护的对象似乎还包括《华尔街日报》的发行商。这也将意味着,新闻集团将不得不放弃对《华尔街日报》及道琼斯公司的一些预算决策的控制权。目前看来,新闻集团似乎不愿意接受限制其经营道琼斯商业事务的条款。

此外,预计班克罗夫特家族将继续对新闻集团施加压力,为后者未来使用道琼斯的品牌设置更多限制。默多克曾表示,希望使用道琼斯的品牌来推动新闻集团旗下其他媒体平台的发展,对于该公司正在策划的一个新的商业类频道而言,这一点尤为重要。考虑到这一设想,默多克在这方面似乎不会向班克罗夫特家族让步。

在上个月写给班克罗夫特家族的信中,默多克提议建立一个独立的编辑委员会,就像当年收购《泰晤士报》和《星期日泰晤士报》时一样。

班克罗夫特家族的一位成员说,每个人都想确保《华尔街日报》不会出现《泰晤士报》那样的情况。我们认为最重要的是保护报纸的质量。如果买家不愿接受这一点,那么就很难谈下去了。

另一方面,在双方上周的谈判之后,估计班克罗夫特家族的新方案可能已有所让步。有一批顾问人士参与了方案的修改。

班克罗夫特家族的这份方案在过去几天几经修改,预计最早于周四送给新闻集团。这将为新闻集团的回应打开大门,如果双方能就这份方案达成一致,他们将很快就价格展开谈判,达成交易也指日可待了。但是一些家族成员却认为,双方不可能很快达成协议。另一位家族成员说,没有人想仓促行事。

Sarah Ellison

2007年6月6日星期三

美国网络广告营收第一季度同比增26%

根据美国互联网广告署和普华永道联合公布的最新数据,2007年第一季度美国网络广告营收同比增长26%,达到创纪录的49亿美元


  新浪科技讯 北京时间6月7日消息,据国外媒体报道,根据美国互联网广告署和普华永道联合公布的最新数据,2007年第一季度美国网络广告营收同比增长26%,达到创纪录的49亿美元。

  随着广告客户将越来越多的广告预算由传统媒体转向互联网,美国网络广告市场最近几年一直稳步增长。美国互联网广告署总裁兼CEO兰达尔·罗森伯格(Randall Rothenberg)在声明中称:“从美国网络广告营收持续增长可以看出,广告客户对于互联网媒体越来越有信心。”得益于一系列收购和并购交易,互联网广告领域最近几个月吸引了业界的高度关注。

  今年5月,微软宣布将以60亿美元收购网络广告公司aQuantive;同样在5月,世界第二大广告公司WPP集团宣布将以6.49亿美元收购网络广告公司Real Media;今年4月,谷歌宣布将以31亿美元收购网络广告公司Doubleclick。分析人士预计,随着宽带网络的普及,以及更多服务转到互联网上进行,网络广告市场未来将继续高速增长。

  普华永道董事皮特·佩特鲁斯基(Peter Petrusky)表示:“随着宽带用户人数持续增加,网络广告营收也将水涨船高。也就是说,将有更多用户花费更多时间在互联网上,而且互联网将成为一个富媒体和视频广告平台。”(摩尔)